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ABSTRACT  
While a strong stream of research has examined the value-added by venture capitalists and some recent 
research has also explored the value added by corporate venture capitalists, the value-added provided 
by these two types of investors for their portfolio companies has not been compared systematically. 
This study proposes to make such an evaluation by comparing the social capital based and knowledge-
based forms of value added provided by independent and corporate venture capitalists to their portfolio 
firms. Employing primary data collected from U.S. technology-based new firms that had recently 
received both corporate venture capital and independent venture capital funding, the present study 
demonstrates that the value-adding contributions of corporate venture capital and independent venture 
capital investors are different but complementary.  
INTRODUCTION  
Past research has examined the value-added provided by independent venture capitalists for their 
portfolio companies. Recently, some studies have also started to examine the value-adding 
contributions made by corporate venture capitalists to the commercial success of their portfolio firms. 
However, so far, there have been no studies that have rigorously compared and evaluated the distinct 
contributions of each of these two types of investors when they are present as co-investors. This current 
study proposes to make such an evaluation by comparing the social capital based and knowledge-based 
forms of value added provided by independent and corporate venture capitalists to their portfolio firms. 
Employing primary data collected from U.S. technology-based new firms that had recently received 
both corporate venture capital and independent venture capital funding, the present study demonstrates 
that the value-adding contributions of corporate venture capital and independent venture capital 
investors are different but complementary.  
We draw eclectically on the social capital theory and the knowledge-based and learning frameworks to 
develop hypotheses of the value-adding benefits of corporate and independent venture capital investors 
for their portfolio firms. The hypotheses are tested using primary data on 91 matched pairs of dyads 
between U.S. technology-based new firms and their most important CVC and VC investors, 
respectively. We employ univariate analyses and multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses.  
To our knowledge, this is the first rigorous empirical study that compares the forms and importance of 
various value-added forms of CVC and VC investors by employing primary data collected from CEOs 
of technology-based new firms. The research also contributes to the literature on firm-specific and 
relational social capital by demonstrating how differences between the two types of investors influence 
the social capital leveraged in the investor-investee dyads.  
The findings have also important performance implications for the commercial activities of both the 
corporate and independent venture capital investors as well as for the entrepreneur. When acting co-
operatively within investment syndicates both types of investor have the ability to provide their 
common portfolio companies with value adding, complementary capabilities that are made more 
effective by the generation of social capital. The empirical evidence suggests strongly that these two 
investment vehicles are not substitutes but exhibit strong positive additionalities.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Earlier Research on Investor Value-Added  
In earlier studies examining the nature of value-added support provided by independent venture 
capitalists, MacMillan et al. (1988) reported that activities attracting the highest degree of venture 
capitalists involvement were: (1) serving as a sounding board to the entrepreneur team, (2) helping the 
firm obtain alternative further sources of equity financing, (3) interfacing with the investor group, (4) 
monitoring financial performance, (5) monitoring operating performance, and (6) helping their 
portfolio firms attract alternative sources of debt financing. Quite similarly, Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989) documented a ranked order of the forms of assistance as follows: (1) help with obtaining 
additional financing, (2) strategic planning, (3) management recruitment, (4) operational planning, (5) 
introductions to potential customers and suppliers, and (6) resolving compensation issues. Sapienza et 
al. have conducted several studies on sources of value-added provided by both U.S. and European 
venture capitalists. In their studies, strategic roles ranked highest followed by interpersonal roles 
(Sapienza et al., 1994; 1996). Strategic roles included acting as a sounding board as well as being a 
finance and business advisor. Rosenstein et al. (1993) also examined this issue from the CEO’s 
perspective and concluded that most important roles for professional equity providers were principally 
monitoring financial performance, serving as a sounding board to the entrepreneur team and 
recruiting/replacing the CEO. Synthesizing the results of earlier studies, the most valuable 
contributions of independent venture capitalists, other than the initial provision of capital, are in 
arranging additional financing, supporting strategy making, and recruiting key executives.  
There is significantly less research on the value-added provided by corporate venture capitalists. 
Previous research by Maula & Murray (2000) and numerous practitioner accounts suggest that 
corporate venture capital investment managers may, similarly, have an important role in improving the 
public legitimacy of young, unknown ventures. Partly because of this certification benefit, corporate 
venture capitalists are seen to have an important role in helping the young firm attract new commercial 
partners and customers. Additionally, corporate venture capitalists can offer tangible technical support 
given that industry-leading corporations are highly active and influential in the development of related 
technologies and in defining the direction of future innovation via their involvement in the creation of 
industry-wide, technology roadmaps. Recently, Maula (2001) developed a model of three main 
mechanisms through which portfolio companies receive value-added from their corporate venture 
capital investors: resource acquisition, knowledge acquisition, and endorsement. Resource acquisition 
refers to concrete resources such as distribution channels or production capacity. Knowledge 
acquisition refers to learning for instance from technology, markets, competition. Endorsement refers 
to the increased credibility caused by the affiliation with a large corporation. The model was validated 
using primary data from U.S technology-based new firms.  
In this study, we focus on two kinds of value-added forms. First, we consider benefits based on the 
social capital of the investors. We assume that there are differences in the social networks of 
independent and corporate venture capital investors, differences in who they know. These differences 
should be reflected in their value added. Secondly, we expect to see differences in the competence 
areas of the two types of investors, differences in what they know. Also, these differences should be 
reflected in their value added. Overall, we construct nine hypotheses for testing. Using direct feedback 
from the portfolio firms, we seek to identify, differences between independent venture capitalists or a 
corporate venture capitalists in terms of their ability to add value to their portfolio firms. Finally, we 
examine whether the different types of value-added are differently related to the overall value-added 
perceived by the entrepreneurs.  
HYPOTHESES  
Value Added Based on Social Capital  
Social capital to attract financing. One of the common roles of equity investors is helping the growing 
company obtain new financing when needed (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1998; 
Sapienza et al., 1996). Because of the staged nature of venture capital financing, companies typically 
seek several rounds of investments before they are commercially mature enough for a liquidity event. 
Independent venture capitalists are financial professionals. Their single key objective is to maximize 
the financial returns of their fund and thus the economic rewards of their investors (limited partners). In 
so doing, they maximize their own financial rewards via the carried interest incentive structure. 
Venture capitalists typically cultivate a broad network of commercial partners and allies in the financial 
markets. This network will include investment bankers and other venture capitalists. In comparison, 
corporate venture capitalists often prioritize strategic goals above financial goals. As a consequence, 
corporate venture capitalists may possess smaller and less valuable social networks within the financial 
community. Also, the generally smaller experience of corporate venture capitalists at deal making 
causes them to prefer to invest via syndication. Given their relatively greater experience, the venture 
capital firm commonly acts as the lead investor and takes primary responsibility for assessing the 
valuation and determining the financial structure of the deal. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
independent venture capitalists will have a more dominant role in helping to arrange additional 
financing for portfolio firms.  
Hypothesis 1: VCs are more valuable in helping portfolio companies obtain additional financing than 
CVCs.  
Social capital to attract key executives. Another often cited role of venture capitalists is to help in the 
identification and hiring of key executives in order to realize the growth plans of their portfolio 
companies (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstein et al., 1993). Whereas independent venture 
capitalists work with a wide network of people outside of their own organizations, the experience and 
contacts of corporate venture capitalists may be more defined by and focused on their own corporation. 
We hypothesize that independent venture capitalists are likely to be viewed by portfolio firms as more 
valuable in helping to recruit key management.  
Hypothesis 2: VCs are more valuable in helping portfolio companies recruit new employees than 
CVCs.  
Social capital to attract partners. Venture capitalists may be admired for their commercial acumen and 
financial knowledge. However, they are likely to have relatively less authority in areas that directly 
relate to the core business of the portfolio firm. Because of their corporate background, it may well be 
that only the name of an internationally respected corporate partner is sufficient to attract business 
partners (Kelley & Spinelli, 2001). In biotechnology, for example, it is often difficult for an outsider 
investor to assess with sufficient accuracy the potential of a new technology. In such cases, the 
investment by a respected “big pharma” corporation may effectively signal the attractive prospects of 
the start-up to less informed outsiders. As such, the actions of the corporate investor help reduce 
information asymmetries that may limit the future prospects of the start-up company. Robert Young, 
the CEO of Red Hat Linux, commented after receiving corporate venture capital investments from Intel 
and Netscape: “The significance of closing this round with Intel and Netscape was that it made Linux-
based operating systems safe for the major application vendors, including Oracle, Corel, and Computer 
Associates. They would now be willing to sell their applications to their customers running on Red Hat 
Linux.” (Young & Rohm, 1999). Thus, we hypothesize that corporate venture capitalists are better at 
helping their portfolio companies to attract partners.  
Hypothesis 3: CVCs are more valuable in helping portfolio companies obtain attract new partners than 
VCs.  
Social capital to attract new domestic customers. A major problem facing virtually all start-ups is that 
no one, including would-be customers, really knows anything about them. Accordingly, no-one wants 
to be the first to use their products. As Geoffrey Moore (1995) observed, buyers from large 
corporations are profoundly risk-averse. They will always insist that some one else is “the guinea pig.” 
Thus, small firms commonly suffer “a liability of alienness” – no one wants to know them until they 
have a credible track record of business deals (Burgel et al., 2001). This is a Catch 22 situation. They 
cannot sell to large firms or other important customers—regardless of the quality of their technology 
and products—until they can demonstrate a track record. But they cannot gain a track record until they 
sell to large firms or other important customers. Corporate venture capitalists are among the few 
organizations that have the market power to resolve this impasse easily. Their portfolio companies can 
be given access to the corporation’s worldwide sales and marketing channels. The corporate investor 
can also become a publicly visible supplier, purchaser, or advocate of the company’s products. The 
young firm may initially be unknown but the fact that GE Capital, Intel Capital, Nokia Venture 
Partners or Johnson & Johnson Development Corporation is an investor conveys a huge endorsement 
benefit to the young and erstwhile “invisible” company. Therefore, we hypothesize that corporate 
venture capitalists are better at helping their portfolio forms gain wider market credibility and attract 
customers.  
Hypothesis 4: CVCs are more valuable in helping portfolio companies attract new domestic customers 
than VCs.  
Social capital to attract new foreign customers. Whereas venture capital investors typically operate 
locally (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001), parent corporations of corporate venture capital investors are 
typically global corporations. The support from corporate venture capitalists in helping portfolio firms 
attract new customers is likely to be even more effective when focusing on foreign customers. Many 
corporate venture capital operations are specialist units of established organizations with global 
presence and reputations. In contrast, the majority of venture capitalist firms are much more local in 
both operation and influence. Therefore, we expect that the involvement of corporate venture capital 
investors is relatively more effective in helping portfolio firms internationalize and attract foreign 
customers.  
Hypothesis 5: CVCs are more valuable in helping portfolio companies obtain new foreign customers 
than VCs.  
Value Added Based on Knowledge  
Knowledge on markets. As established industry players enjoy deep specialist knowledge across a range 
of related sectors, corporations often have a better understanding of technological developments in 
their key product markets. Technology-based new firms can sometimes lack a broader perspective on 
the market and customer needs. On the other hand, corporations spend large amounts of money on their 
market research and operate globally. From their existing customer relationships, they have a different 
and deeper understanding of the market needs than a start-up developing a product for future markets. 
Access to the market understanding of the large corporation may be invaluable for a technology-based 
new firm (Dube, 2000:49; Maula & Murray; 2000).  
Hypothesis 6: CVCs are more valuable in providing information on customer needs and trends than 
VCs.  
Knowledge on competition. Large corporations primarily compete against other large corporations. 
They are very likely to ignore or not even notice small start-ups. Traditionally trained corporate 
managers may have little direct understanding or interest in the world as seen by a new firm. In 
contrast, the role of venture capital managers centers on the nurturing and growth of firms which while 
economically small today might become the industry leaders of tomorrow. When considering the actual 
development of the young firm’s business strategy, it has been found that one of the most important 
forms of value-added provided by independent venture capitalists is acting as a sounding board to 
management in order to help develop the firm’s strategic plans and goals. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that independent venture capitalists are more likely to provide start-ups with information on 
competition.  
Hypothesis 7: VCs are more valuable in providing information on competition than CVCs.  
Knowledge on technology. The over-riding goal of the majority of corporate venture capitalists is to 
add strategic value for their corporate parent organization (Keil, 2000; McNally, 1997; Siegel et al., 
1988; Sykes, 1990). Given that most corporations active in corporate venture capital are from 
technology intensive industries, knowledge on technology is likely to be one of the core benefits they 
can also provide for their portfolio companies. Both parties can gain reciprocally from detailed 
technical knowledge and insights held by either the corporation or the highly focused young firm. As 
investors, corporations generally have an ability to undertake technical “due diligence” in their areas of 
technical competence with a level of rigor and depth of resources unavailable and inaccessible to even 
the largest private venture capital firm. Consider the words of John M. Troyer, a co-founder of 
Neomar, a developer of wireless internet products who chose two corporations active operating in the 
wireless market as their external investors: “We felt like many of the venture firms we talked to didn’t 
have a clear understanding of the wireless space yet” (The Corporate Venturing Report, 2001). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that corporate venture capitalists are likely to be seen as stronger in the 
technology related knowledge they provide for their portfolio companies.  
Hypothesis 8: CVCs are more valuable in providing information on new technologies than VCs.  
Knowledge on organizing. Independent venture capitalists are often experienced entrepreneurs 
themselves. As venture capitalists, they have followed, monitored, and guided numerous start-ups from 
firm formation and the initial investment to the eventual liquidity event at which these professional 
investors will exit the business. In contrast, many of the career managers recruited internally into the 
corporate venture capital divisions have their backgrounds exclusively in the corporate world. 
Accordingly, they view start-ups and their commercial environments largely from a more limited 
corporate perspective. Therefore, we hypothesize that independent venture capitalists have greater and 
wider experiences with which to help portfolio companies manage early growth.  
Hypothesis 9: VCs are more valuable in helping organize for growth than corporate VCs.  
DATA AND METHODS  
Data  
The hypotheses were tested using data from a survey administered to CEOs and founders of CVC 
financed U.S. technology-based new firms in December 2000. CVC backed companies were identified 
from the Venture Economics database. A technology-based new firm was defined as a firm less than 6 
years old and operating in one of the following sectors: biotechnology, medical/health science, internet 
specific, communications, computer software and services, computer hardware, or 
semiconductors/other electronics. We also required that the venture had received funding from at least 
one independent venture capitalist. Companies that had been acquired, had gone public, or had 
subsequently ceased operation were excluded. We also required that the most recent investment in the 
portfolio company had been made within the last two years in order to ensure that the relationship was 
still active. Finally, we excluded ventures that were found to be originally spin-offs from the 
corporation currently acting as a corporate investor in order to preserve the perspective of a new 
venture having accepted corporate venture capital financing.  
The sampling frame consisted of the entire population of 810 privately-held technology-based new 
firms fulfilling the selection criteria at the time of the survey (November 2000–January-2001). Of the 
135 questionnaires received, 91 met all sample selection criteria and were sufficiently complete. This 
translates to a response rate of 17 %, which can be considered acceptable given that it was requested 
that the four-page questionnaires be completed by CEOs. In this population, the average age of the 
firms was just over three years, with an average of $55 million external investment. With average 
revenues of less than $5 million per year, the CEOs of these companies were likely to be under strong 
investor pressure to grow their business rapidly.  
Non-response bias was analyzed by comparing the age, geographic location, and industry sectors 
between the respondent and the non-respondent firms. We conducted further response bias analysis by 
comparing statistically the number of employees and the revenues of early and late respondents. For all 
tests, no significant biases were detected.  
Several methods were used to ensure the validity and reliability of the data. First, we pre-tested the 
four-page survey instrument with several CEOs and CVC investors. In the instrument, previously 
validated constructs and measurement items were used whenever possible. Multi-item constructs were 
used for most primary variables in order to enhance content coverage. In all but one case, our multi-
item constructs achieved construct reliabilities of .74 or higher, thus indicating good internal 
consistency.  
Measures  
Ten constructs are used to test the hypotheses. In pairwise univariate comparisons we compare the 
activity of the two types of investors in nine areas of value-added. In the regression analyses, we test 
the roles of these nine types of value-added in explaining the overall value-added and satisfaction in the 
two types of relationships.  
The overall value-added was measured using a multi-item scale measuring the overall satisfaction of 
the key informants. The construct was operationalized using three measurement items: “This investor 
has provided us valuable value adding support in addition to the financing,” “The value adding support 
provided by this investor has been critical for our success,” and “We are very happy about having this 
investor.” The Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficient for this construct is .87. To ensure the 
reliability of the construct a follow-up survey measuring the CVC relationships was administered for 
the original respondents six months after the original survey. The original value-added construct and 
the 6 months lagged construct were highly correlated (r = .576, p <= .001) suggesting good reliability 
for this construct. Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA, using firm identity as the independent variable, 
revealed that between firm-variance was significantly greater than within-firm variance (p <= .001), 
indicating significant agreement between the original and the lagged ratings. Together, these tests 
provided additional evidence of construct validity.  
The forms of value-added were divided in two groups: social capital based forms of value-added and 
knowledge-based forms of value-added. In the first group, the value-added forms were related to the 
support in attracting five types of resources: 1) additional investors; 2) key employees; 3) partners; 4) 
domestic customers; and foreign customers. All of these constructs were defined using four indicators. 
Cronbach’s alpha inter-item reliability coefficients for these constructs varied between .74 and .93.  
In the second group, the value-added forms were related to the advice based on four types of 
knowledge: 1) markets; 2) competition; 3) technology; 4) organization. All of these constructs were 
defined using two indicators. For market knowledge of VCs, the reliability was only .63. For all the 
others, the reliabilities ranged between .77 and .92.  
RESULTS  
We first tested the hypotheses using pairwise comparisons of the value-added forms between most 
important VC and CVC investors of the sample companies. The results are presented in Table 1. In 
general, the results support our hypotheses. Independent venture capitalists were found to be viewed as 
better at helping portfolio companies obtain new financing, recruiting key employees, and helping 
develop the organization. In contrast, corporate venture capitalists appear to be stronger helping 
startups attract new partners, helping them attract new domestic and foreign customers, and helping 
start-ups develop their technology.  
Using multiple regression analysis, we tested whether the value-added forms contribute differently to 
the overall value-added in the two types of relationships. The regression results are presented in Table 
2. While the Chow test was not statistically significant, there are significant differences in the 
importance of individual forms of value-added.  
Whereas pairwise comparison indicated that VCs have a more visible role in attracting further 
financing, the regression analysis showed that this activity is a significant determinant also in the CVC 
relationships. However, while recruiting key employees was a significant determinant of value-added 
in VC relationships, it was insignificant in CVC relationships. Attracting partners was not a significant 
determinant in either type of relationships. The results were the same for domestic customers. 
Attracting foreign customers was not significant determinant of value-added in VC relationships but 
was significant in CVC relationships.  
Concerning the differences in the importance of knowledge-based value-added, market knowledge was 
not a significant determinant in either types of relationships. However, in VC relationships, competitor 
knowledge was weakly significant. Technological knowledge was not significant in VC relationships, 
but was significant in CVC relationships. Finally, organizing knowledge was very significant in VC 
relationships but not significant in CVC relationships.  
DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we set out to examine how differences in the social capital and competencies of 
independent venture capitalists and corporate venture capitalists are reflected in the value-added they 
provide for their portfolio companies. We first tested the differences in the support in various areas and 
thereafter examined the importance of these areas for the perceived overall value-added. We found that 
VC investors seem to make entrepreneurs happy by arranging financing, recruiting key employees, 
advising on competition, and developing organization. CVC investors seem to make entrepreneurs 
happy also by attracting further financing, but also by attracting foreign customers, and advising on 
technology.  
The value-added forms provided by independent venture capitalists can be classified as “enterprise 
nurturing.” The collective experience of the venture capitalists, many of whom have advised literally 
dozens of entrepreneurs on the challenges of enterprise formation and early-stage growth, represents a 
potentially enormously valuable resource. Venture capitalists particularly can advise with authority 
thereby enabling the young firm to avoid many of the mistakes to which new businesses are 
particularly vulnerable. The value-added forms actively contributed by corporate venture capitalists 
relate directly to the trading and commercial environment of the new business and can be termed 
“commerce building.” Here the emphasis is not on the structure and organization of the new enterprise 
but on its ability to forge revenue generating opportunities form its contractual relationships with both 
customers and suppliers. In these production/product/market areas, the corporation has greater 
experience and authority.  
The key conclusion from the research is that corporate venture capitalists and independent venture 
capitalists have different and complementary value-added profiles. Independent venture capitalists 
appear to have superior enterprise nurturing skills. They can better help entrepreneurial founders 
transform their ideas into viable companies through their skills and experience in developing strategy, 
obtaining additional financing and helping to recruit key employees. On the other hand, corporate 
venture capitalists appear to have a stronger role in in-creasing the commercial and public credibility of 
their portfolio forms through their deep, commerce building experience. Their public involvement as 
investors, given their international status, helps young firms attract customers, suppliers, and partners. 
Finally, the young firm’s involvement with sophisticated technology and research based corporations 
also has a direct benefit in helping support the technological developments of the young firm.  
Implications for Technology-Based New Firms and Investors  
A clear practical implication of this study is that careful investor selection is extremely important for 
start-up CEOs. As documented by Smith (2001), start-ups often do have some choice in this matter. 
Depending of the specific array of needs of the start-up company, an optimal “value-added portfolio” 
may be constructed by specifically selecting both independent venture capital investors and corporate 
venture capitalists based on these investors’ ability to each provide complementary support and advice 
in their respective areas of strength. Similarly, given that both types of investors are also seeking to 
build successful companies albeit for different objectives, co-operative syndication may equally further 
their own interests more efficiently than if they invested in isolation.  
Implications for Research  
This paper has demonstrated that independent venture capital investors and corporate venture capital 
investors have different social capital and knowledge to offer to their portfolio companies. This has 
been the first paper to empirically examine the differences in the value added and to examine the main 
types of social capital and knowledge offered by both types of investors that influence the overall 
value-added and satisfaction of the entrepreneurs. In future research, it would be interesting to examine 
whether there are differences in the factors that influence the perceived usefulness of the value-added 
of the two types of investors.  
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